Europe’s Crisis: Policy Decisions and Their Consequences

Introduction

Future historians may well ask what led to the decline and ruin of Europe. The actions and decisions of key leaders in recent decades have played a pivotal role, with policies that have shaped the continent’s current challenges.

Angela Merkel: Architect of European Transformation

Dr. Tilak K. Doshi of the Daily Skeptic identifies Angela Merkel as a central figure in Europe’s troubles. In 2015, Merkel oversaw a massive wave of immigration into Europe, primarily from the Muslim world. Simultaneously, she implemented net zero policies, decommissioning nuclear power and removing fossil fuels from the German industrial base. This dual focus—shutting down nuclear and coal power plants in favor of wind and solar energy—initiated a process that is now undermining the German economy.

Merkel’s rationale for accepting millions of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa was to address Europe’s low fertility rates and to bring in “doctors and engineers” to support the economy. However, Doshi observes that Germany and the European Union instead received an influx of fighting-age males, often crime-prone and resistant to assimilation, placing additional strain on already overstretched welfare systems. As current Chancellor Merz acknowledged, “The welfare state that we have today can no longer be financed with what we produce in the economy.”

Doshi concludes that both social and economic consequences were predictable: crime surges and the rise of parallel societies in cities such as Cologne and Berlin, as well as elsewhere in Europe, including Malmo in Sweden and Southport in England. Industry has increasingly relocated to the United States and Asia in search of affordable energy, leaving Germany—once Europe’s workshop—facing stagnation. Despite these outcomes, Merkel was celebrated by Brussels and mainstream media as the moral conscience of Europe.

Ursula Von Der Leyen and the European Commission

Ursula Von Der Leyen’s tenure as Germany’s defense minister was marked by inefficiency, with the Bundeswehr operating only a handful of tanks and aircrafts. Yet, she now holds the unelected and unaccountable position of President of the European Commission. In her recent “State of the European Union” address, Von Der Leyen reaffirmed her commitment to the “green transformation,” even as European industries falter under electricity costs that are triple those in the United States. Germany’s deindustrialization continues apace, while Britain, under both Conservative and Labour governments, aligns with the EU’s climate and immigration policies and shuts down vital steelworks, refineries, and offshore energy operations.

Despite these trends, Von Der Leyen’s rhetoric invokes economic competitiveness and energy security, even as policies restrict the fossil fuel sector that would otherwise deliver growth and affordable energy. As Doshi remarks, Europe has become a civilization sacrificing its productive capacity at the altar of Gaia. Von Der Leyen also criticizes elected officials like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, who resist unvetted immigration policies and defend national traditions. Orbán, for instance, is branded an “ally of Russia” for importing affordable gas and prioritizing Hungarian interests, while Fico faces similar condemnation for refusing mass migration and the latest ‘woke’ gender dogmas. Their insistence on national interests and skepticism of EU unity mark them as heretics to the European creed.

Centralization, Censorship, and Loss of Freedom

The European Union’s drive for tighter control over national politics has led to troubling developments, including the nullification of elections in Romania, interference in Moldova’s elections, and proposals for government access to private internet communications. Von Der Leyen’s push for net zero policies and increased censorship has contributed to a less free Europe, burdened by bureaucratic rules and unsustainable economic and energy policies.

A Crisis of Civilization

Europe’s difficulties are not merely economic—they reflect a deeper crisis of civilization. Doshi argues that elites such as Von Der Leyen have lost faith in the fundamental tenets of Western civilization, prioritizing sentiment over substance. The tendency to replace engineers with activists in energy ministries and to elevate failed ministers to international office has proved disastrous. The economic cost of such virtue signaling is severe: Europe’s electricity and gas prices are among the highest globally, crippling its manufacturing sector. Major industries are relocating to countries with more rational energy policies, while Europe’s share of global industrial output declines and its welfare states consume ever more of a shrinking economic pie.

Inversion of Priorities and the Cost to the Working Class

Europe’s decline is a result of deliberate choices favoring bureaucratic globalism over national aspirations. Doshi highlights Von Der Leyen’s recent call for multilateral development banks to focus on climate change rather than poverty, despite opposition from the United States. This inversion of priorities illustrates how Europe’s elites perceive the main problem of the poor as insufficient decarbonization, rather than lack of opportunity. Yet, evidence indicates that economic growth—not emissions cuts—remains the most reliable path to environmental improvement and human welfare.

The true victims are the working class, who bear the burden of high energy bills and face a future of mounting debts and a declining civilization. Doshi argues that Europe must rediscover the virtues of Western civilization that once enabled it to prosper and remain free and must reverse the momentum of its decline.

Biden and Obama policies failure that Trump inherited.

Let’s lay out a few facts: Donald Trump twice inherited heightened global instability from previous administrations. Specifically, he faced increased tensions with North Korea, ongoing conflict and chaos in the Middle East—much of which escalated during the Obama years—and further complications from Biden’s team, many of whom were also involved in earlier policy failures, it’s clear that Trump stepped into office at a time when international threats and regional turmoil were already on the rise.

Middle East Policy: The Role of Iran and U.S. Leadership

One of the most misguided foreign policy approaches in recent history was the belief that Iran could serve as a stabilizing force in the Middle East. The Obama administration’s strategy, which involved providing Iran with substantial financial resources and effectively permitting the continuation of its nuclear program beyond Obama’s tenure, was founded on the premise that a “balance of power” among Iran, the Sunni Arab states, and Israel would yield stability. However, this assumption overlooked the reality that Iran is a revolutionary power rather than a stabilizing influence, and much of the turmoil in the Middle East can be traced directly to Tehran’s actions.

When President Trump took office, he inherited an emboldened and aggressive Iran, fortified by financial assets provided through previous U.S. policy decisions. To address this, Trump imposed sanctions that significantly damaged the Iranian economy and sought to curb its regional influence. Conversely, the Biden administration reinstated aspects of the earlier Obama-era Middle East policy. As a result, Iran and its proxies in Syria, Yemen, Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon once again became sources of instability and conflict throughout the region.

A chronological review of recent Middle East geopolitical developments illustrates shifting alliances and U.S. foreign policy challenges. On September 15, 2020, the Abraham Accords were signed, normalizing relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, with later participation from Sudan and Morocco; this marked a significant diplomatic breakthrough in the region. However, in subsequent years, Saudi Arabia began exploring deeper economic ties with China, evidenced by reports in 2022 and 2023 of discussions around settling some oil trades in Chinese yuan, rather than exclusively in U.S. dollars—a move interpreted by some analysts as a response to perceived inconsistencies in U.S. policy and a desire for diversified security partnerships (Wall Street Journal, 3/15/2022; Reuters, 3/16/2023). Critics of U.S. policy argue that a return to Obama-era strategies under the Biden administration contributed to Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of alternative alliances, while others contend that global economic trends and China’s growing influence played a substantial role. During his presidency, Donald Trump positioned himself as a mediator in Middle East conflicts, notably supporting Israel and applying pressure on Iran through sanctions. While Trump’s administration reportedly encouraged restraint by Israel during periods of heightened tension with Iran and advocated for negotiations, accounts of direct U.S.-brokered cease-fire interventions remain subject to debate among foreign policy experts (New York Times, 1/3/20f20; Brookings, 2/5/2020). Supporters argue that Trump’s approach fostered new diplomatic opportunities, while critics highlight ongoing instability and question the long-term effectiveness of his policies.   Experts need to understand that Israel restraint and wiliness to cooperate with Trump is that Israel understand Trump has its back plus many Arab nations view Iran as a threat to them. Overall, the evolving dynamics underscore a complex interplay of regional interests, great power competition, and shifting U.S. engagement in Middle East affairs. Trump thinking outside the box has rearranged America foreign policies.

Ukraine- This was yet another disaster Biden left Trump as the Ukraine has been fighting for their survival in a war that Biden weakness allowed to happen. When Biden pulled out of Afghanistan the way he did, it sent a message to Putin this is not a serious man and when Biden said that if Putin made a small excursion that is okay and Putin understood that to mean Biden would do nothing. In the Obama first administration Putin took Crimea and a portion of Ukraine, and it was the Obama administration that essentially allowed the Budapest accord which was to secure Ukraine borders in exchange to be rid of their nuclear weapons. Obama did not view defending Ukraine in our national interest even though he supported the orange revolution that allowed a Putin ally leading Ukraine to be ousted. When Putin marched into Crimea, Obama made it clear that Putin excursion would not be opposed. Trump now has to deal with the fall out of Obama and Biden failures in foreign which Trump inherited a major war in Europe and the Middle East along with America weakness exposed. There is more to dissect in the foreign policy area. The world is a more dangerous place and Biden foreign policy is to blame.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Ukraine War: A Chronological Analysis

Obama Administration and Ukraine: Budapest Accord, Crimea Annexation, and U.S. Response

The roots of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine can be traced back to the geopolitical landscape shaped during the Obama administration. In 1994, the Budapest Memorandum was signed, wherein Ukraine agreed to relinquish its inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia regarding its territorial integrity. However, when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the U.S. response under President Obama was limited to imposing sanctions and diplomatic condemnation, rather than direct military support. While the Obama administration supported Ukraine’s pro-Western aspirations, including backing the Euromaidan protests and the ouster of a pro-Russian leader during the 2014 Orange Revolution, it stopped short of providing lethal aid. Critics argue this measured approach failed to deter further Russian aggression, while others contend that escalation could have risked broader conflict with Moscow.

Trump Administration: Inheriting Challenges and Policy Actions

When Donald Trump assumed office in 2017, he inherited a Ukraine still grappling with Russian occupation in Crimea and ongoing conflict in eastern regions. The Trump administration took a more assertive stance by approving the sale of lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine—such as Javelin anti-tank missiles—a departure from previous policy. Trump’s approach included maintaining sanctions on Russia and supporting NATO’s deterrence measures in Eastern Europe. However, his administration was also marked by controversy, notably the temporary withholding of military aid to Ukraine in 2019, which became the subject of his first impeachment. Supporters argue that Trump’s policies strengthened Ukraine’s defense capabilities, while critics suggest that the aid delay sent mixed signals about U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty. The overall impact of these policies remains debated among analysts.  (One should not forget that Biden did threatened to withhold aid if a prosecutor who was investigating a company in which his son was involved in with and earning million dollars a year.   Biden bragged about this in a recorded conversations.)

Biden Administration: Policy Shifts and Implications for Ukraine

President Joe Biden took office in 2021 amid escalating tensions between Russia and Ukraine. His administration’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 was widely criticized for its execution, with some analysts suggesting it projected an image of diminished U.S. resolve internationally. In early 2022, as Russian troop buildups near Ukraine intensified, President Biden stated that a “minor incursion” by Russia might be met with a different U.S. response than a full-scale invasion, a comment that drew scrutiny for potentially signaling ambiguity to Moscow. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Biden administration responded with robust military, economic, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, along with unprecedented sanctions on Russia. While some argue that earlier, clearer deterrence might have prevented the invasion, others note that Russia’s actions reflect long-standing ambitions that transcend U.S. policy alone.  That latter point fail to mention that Putin didn’t invade Ukraine during the Trump administration.  One reason could be Americans Marines had encounter with Russian mercenaries in the Middle East and as the UK Independent reported, “The artillery barrage was so intense that the US commandos dived into foxholes for protection, emerging covered in flying dirt and debris to fire back at a column of tanks advancing under the heavy shelling. It was the opening salvo in a nearly four-hour assault in February by around 500 pro-Syrian government forces – including Russian mercenaries – that threatened to inflame already simmering tensions between Washington and Moscow…In the end, 200 to 300 of the attacking fighters were killed. The others retreated under merciless air strikes from the US, returning later to retrieve their battlefield dead. None of the Americans at the small outpost in eastern Syria – about 40 by the end of the firefight – were harmed.”  Putin may have concluded that Trump might be more willing to oppose him military.

Complexity of International Relations: Multiple Factors and Perspectives

The causes of the Ukraine war are multifaceted, involving a combination of Russian strategic objectives, NATO expansion debates, and international security assurances. Some experts assert that each U.S. administration’s choices—whether restraint, engagement, or ambiguous signaling—shaped the context for Russian decision-making. The evolving conflict underscores the challenges of deterrence, alliance management, and the unpredictability of authoritarian actors in the international system. A comprehensive understanding requires examining not only U.S. policy decisions, but also the broader dynamics at play in Eastern Europe and beyond.

Observations

Point one

John Fetterman let the cat out of the bag as he noted that Democrats shutdown the government and he is not going to call his opponent Nazis.   He is ready to open up government and realize that this may backfire on the Democrats and his support for Isreal has hurt him with Democrats.  The question is whether in 2028, the left can remove him in the primary or whether the Democrat voters are ready to abandon their socialist wing or Fetterman loses to a hard-core leftist.  At this point would Fetterman run a third party?

Point Two

Greg Roman in Middle East Forum noted about Gaza, “The strategic imperative remains unchanged: empowering Gaza’s clan structures, which represent 72 percent of Gaza’s 2.3 million residents through 608 registered mukhtars and six major Bedouin confederations, to fill the governance vacuum as Hamas is systematically removed.”  Right now Hamas are going after their political opponents including clans to secure their own control but there is one options to Hamas, the clans themselves and while not perfect, better options for Palestine.  Hamas will not lead Palestine to statehood.

Point Three

The number one persecuted religion is Christianity and one of the worst offender are Muslims. In Nigeria alone, thousands have been murdered in a genocidal rage.  Wonder why this doesn’t get more attention?

Trump Policy

America First: The Trump Approach to U.S. Foreign Policy

Introduction

The Trump administration’s foreign policy is characterized by a distinct America First approach, which is neither isolationist nor driven by hubris. Instead, it is grounded in the principle of defending U.S. national interests. This philosophy draws from historical precedents, particularly the Cap Weinberger Doctrine, which established foundational rules for military engagement.

The Cap Weinberger Doctrine: Principles of Engagement

Former Secretary of Defense Cap Weinberger outlined six essential rules for U.S. military engagement:

  1. Forces should not be committed unless the action is vital to national interest.
  2. Forces should be committed wholeheartedly with the intention of winning, or not at all, there should be no half-hearted commitment.
  3. Commitment of forces must have clearly defined political and military objectives.
  4. The use of force should be a last resort, employed only after all diplomatic initiatives have been exhausted.
  5. The relationship between objectives and the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
  6. There must be reasonable assurance of public support before committing forces abroad.

Weinberger introduced these principles in the post-Vietnam era, responding to national divisions and concerns about the management of the war. These guidelines remain relevant for political leaders today.

Historical Context: Lessons from Lebanon and Grenada

In 1983, two significant events shaped U.S. foreign policy: the loss of 240 Marines in Beirut due to a suicide bombing and the invasion of Grenada, where U.S. forces ousted a Marxist government backed by Cuban forces. The Beirut mission was criticized for its unclear objectives, leading President Reagan to withdraw U.S. troops, avoiding prolonged entanglement. In contrast, the Grenada operation was executed decisively, swiftly removing Cuban forces from the region.

Trump’s Application of Weinberger’s Principles

President Trump has exhibited caution in the use of military force, adhering to many of Weinberger’s principles. He has resisted placing American troops in harm’s way, such as in Ukraine, and has favored measured responses in the Middle East. For example, airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities were only undertaken after diplomatic efforts failed, supporting a broader strategy of stability. In these operations, Israel played a critical role by neutralizing Iranian air defenses, facilitating U.S. access to key targets.

Middle East Strategy and the Role of Alliances

Since October 7th, Israel has fought Iranian proxies, including Hezbollah and Hamas. Trump distinguished his approach from the Biden administration by granting Israel autonomy to address Iranian threats directly. His objective in bombing Iranian nuclear facilities was to delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions, after which he urged both sides to pursue a truce. Trump’s actions demonstrated an ability to escalate conflict strategically to deescalate and pursue peace, as seen in his involvement with Qatar and efforts to solidify alliances through the Abraham Accords, which aimed to unite Israel and Sunni Arab states against Iranian influence.

Opposition to Transnational Organizations

A central feature of Trump’s America First policy is skepticism toward transnational organizations. His rejection of the Paris Climate Accords in 2017 and after taking office was based on concerns that the agreement hindered American energy policy while favoring countries like China and India. Trump maintains that such accords disadvantage the United States. He has asserted that his own diplomatic initiatives have produced more tangible results than those of the United Nations.

Pragmatic Diplomacy and Cultural Realism

Trump’s foreign policy does not focus on spreading democracy, though he welcomes its growth. He has acknowledged cultural differences, notably when addressing Saudi Arabia’s domestic achievements without advocating for the imposition of democratic systems. His emphasis is on respecting national sovereignty, encouraging countries to avoid threatening their neighbors or the United States.

Immigration and Cultural Preservation

Trump has expressed concern about the erosion of Western civilization, attributed to open borders in the U.S. and Europe. He believes that unchecked immigration without assimilation undermines national identity, viewing secure borders as essential to preserving American culture. He has echoed the sentiment that immigration without assimilation amounts to conquest, reinforcing his commitment to border security and cultural integrity.

Energy Independence and Economic Strategy

Energy independence is a cornerstone of Trump’s foreign policy. He aims for the U.S. to lead global energy production, minimizing obstacles to development and leveraging energy exports to strengthen alliances. Trump warned European allies against reliance on Russian oil and gas, advocating for American energy as a more stable alternative. Promoting American energy exports not only benefits the U.S. economy but also solidifies strategic partnerships.

Modest Foreign Policy: Prioritizing American Interests

Trump’s approach is characterized by a modest foreign policy, placing American interests above all else. He recognizes the importance of alliances based on mutual benefit but resists arrangements that disadvantage the U.S., such as unfavorable tariffs. His negotiations aim to protect American workers, expand manufacturing, and encourage allied countries to adopt policies supportive of U.S. interests. Tariffs have also served as a tool to address border security and decouple manufacturing from China.

Strategic Objectives and Measurable Outcomes

Trump emphasizes the importance of clear strategic objectives and measurable outcomes before committing military or diplomatic resources. His foreign policy leverages economic tools and alliances to advance American interests, adapting previous administration principles to contemporary challenges. This pragmatic leadership seeks to position the United States as a decisive actor on the global stage.

Influences: Nixon and Reagan

In many respects, Trump combines the foreign policy approaches of Nixon and Reagan. He focuses on stabilizing the world through peace negotiations and strategic competition, particularly with China, while strengthening the American economy. Nixon’s legacy includes innovative diplomacy, such as leveraging China against the Soviet Union, while Reagan emphasized the importance of a strong economy as the foundation for effective foreign policy.

Lies told by the other side

If the past week following the Texas Flood shown anything, it shows how true Tony Heller comment he made to me during an interview, when he observed that  “when debating science with alarmists, they lie.”  

Between the fact that the Texas departments were indeed fully staff and sent warning of the flash flood to the fact that what  happened weather wise was not out of the ordinary as there have these floods were similar to past activities in the region.  A similar flood in the same locality nearly four decades ago also resulted in flood deaths.

While we are told repeatedly that every extreme weather happening is the result of man-made climate change but at this point, there is no evidence to suggest that extreme weathers have increased in both intensity or numbers and even the IPCC, the gospel of alarmists, have conceded that.  Yet, after the flood we were told that this was a sign of climate change, and we are seeing it is out of the ordinary.  The data says otherwise and yet the alarmists keep lying and continue to argue this is unusual weather pattern in spite of the data.  We are not seeing an increase in extreme weather and another fact ignored that deaths due to extreme weathers have decreased by over 95 percent.  Some half-million died from extreme weather a century ago compared to 20,000.   Our better  technology driven by fossil fuels has made this possible.

I am 71 years old, and I have “witnessed” end of the world scenarios for the past six decades from the population bomb in which increasing population would lead to overuse of resources and collapse of civilization to the 1970’s ice age scare (and projections of many that we were entering a period of increasing cold weather) to the 1980’ s where the planet would get browner and we were all fry to death.

The reality is much of the extreme predications including from many “we are all going to fry to death from an overheated planet” have fail to come to past.  The opposite has happened.

We have witnessed the following:

  1. The planet has gotten greener and agricultural yields have increased. We are feeding more people better diets than we ever had.
  2. The planet has become more prosperous as the number of middle classes worldwide has increased and in many developed countries, poverty is the exception and not the rule.
  3. Since the mid-19th century, we have seen GDP growth per capita increase severalfold. This progress has throughout the 20th century into the 21st centur
  4. We have seen every health index improved substantially worldwide.
  5. Countries with higher economic growth and free economies not only are more likely politically free but also cleaner environmentally.

None of these outcomes were predicted by many climate alarmists or environmentalist extremist.  The number of wrong predictions has never forced a reassessment by alarmists to maybe review what was mostly wrong with their predictions.

Every five years we live with a tipping point only to see that the tipping point did not happen with, yet another tipping point moved to another future date. 

The basis problem with many alarmists is that they underestimate humanity ability to adjust and the importance of economic freedom to deal with emergencies.   Here are some variables of why we have seen progress:

  1. The rise of free markets ideas that have led to massive growth in GDP for countries and individuals beginning in the West and now starting to spread out around the globe.
  2. The result of economic freedom meant the development of fossil fuels which has fueled this progress. Both free market economics and fossil fuels are anathema to climate alarmist whose solutions is less freedom and more top-down government interventionist policies
  3. Increase of CO2 and warmer planet has certainly not hurt the planet and may be beneficial to the planet and agricultural growth.
  4. Considering that more people die in colder weather than warmer, this has certainly helped the planet.
  5. Free economies have grown the middle class and improve opportunities.

The long-term solution to any dramatic change in climate that nature has in store of us needs economic freedom to deal with the worse.  The biggest problem is not a warmer planet but many alarmists solution to save the planet which has included

  1. The elimination of fossil fuels in which much of our civilization depends upon.
  2. Elimination of entire industry including fossil fuels and much of agricultural involving the raising of animals.  Meat will be replaced by eating bugs.
  3. There has been talk of blocking sun light by geoengineering leaving one to wonder if you want to use solar energy, does blocking sun light diminish solar energy?
  4. Talk of eliminating political freedom beginning with removal of freedom of speech beginning with censoring any scientific idea that oppose man-made climate change.

The elimination of fossil fuels and reducing farming yields will cause the massive starvation of billions and the decline of economic freedom will increase the poverty among even those in many developed countries including the United States.   The biggest threat is not a warming planet, but the solutions proposed by climate alarmist.  For the past several decades we have inundated by predictions of gloom and doom, none of which has actually occurred.  We have instead seen a more prosperous planet and for many, an increase of not just prosperity but economic freedom but all of these gains are threatened by a movement whose goal is less about saving the planet than about controlling our daily lives.  As Richard Lindzen observed, attempting to control CO2 means  you can control life itself. 

Seeing the tree from the forest

There are politicians who merely see the trees but fail to see the whole forest and then there are those who see the forest.   Sometimes situation dictates and politicians are faced with different situation 

Ronald Reagan saw the whole forest, but he spent a lifetime forming his  worldwide view as he spent nearly three decades studying and speaking on issues plus governing the United States largest state,  California before he entered the White House.    When he became President, the Cold War was at its peak, the Soviet empire appeared on the rise, the economy was hit with double digit inflation and Americans were losing confidence and wondering if America’s best days were behind her.

For Reagan, he rebuilt the economy and the military, challenged the Soviet Empire and had a simple solution, we win they lose.  Unlike many in the foreign policy , who viewed the cold war as a permanent feature, Reagan understood that is situation could not last and built his policy around it.  He also wanted to rebuild the economy and promote economic freedom.  Defeating inflation and “supply side economy” was a return to classical free market economic by reducing marginal tax rates and stable monetary policy.  The result was the end of the cold war in the Bush administration and nearly 25-year expansion that lasted four Presidents and congressional control by both Parties.  His ideas were based on seeing the forests beyond just tree.

George H.W. Bush spent his career in the Cold War era, and he found himself in a different world when he became President. He engineered a soft landing to the cold war and then organized resistance to Sadaam Hussein invasion to Kuwait.  Bush was caught between the end of one era and the beginning of another era. In those days, the debate was between whether we were witnessing the beginning of expansion of democracy or the beginning of a clash of civilization.  Bush administration managed the end of the cold war and pushed Hussein out of Kuwait while declaring a new world order but unable to define what that order truly was. 

George W Bush world view began as pushing for more modest foreign policy and opposing nation building but that view went by the wayside as the world of terror began with 9/11.  Bush adopted the world view that Democracy was the desire of all humanity and rejected the idea of clash of civilization.  Bush fail to see that indeed that there was a clash of civilization as Iran wanted to expand its radical Islamist view, Russian wanted to revive the Russian Empire and China rebuilding the Chinese civilization as the World dominant civilization.  We ended up seeing a clash of Western civilization against others.

President Trump began his presidency not so much seeing the forests but trees as he spent most of his live before the Presidency playing with ideas as he supported tax to rich to moving toward Reagan supply side, but he was opposed free trade regimen, and his foreign policy was America first. His American First  fully developed what it meant but in his second administration he started to see more of the forest.

His policies on trade were designed to make trade more equitable as for years, United States had lower tariffs while Europe were rebuilding their economy. But Europe has been rebuilt, and the threats of tariffs may induce more equitable trade agreement  Another part of Trump is the rejection of transnational organization and prefer to bargain nation to nation. Trump is a nationalist, and nationalism is on the rise, and Trump rejection of transnational organization is a defense of a nation free to govern itself.  His speech to the Saudi’s was clear message of his view that nations should be free to determine their own path and not have it imposed.  As long nations stay within their borders and not be bothersome to their neighbors, Trump is not interested in nation building or imposing democracy on others.  He doesn’t look for dragons to slay and for him America first is to defend American interest. 

His attack on the administrative state is attempt to restore the balance between the bureaucracy and the executive branch as he attempts rein in the deep state. Over the years, the bureaucracy has usurped the power of the executive and Congress as there are 10 times as many regulations with the force of law versus the actual law of passed b Congress and you are ten times more likely to face the administrative state as opposed to a jury of your peer.

Trump second administration sees the forest as controlling the administrative state, move the economy toward giving the middle class a break and on foreign policy, move toward a world where each nation decide their own fate based on their culture, he is not interested in a clash of civilization as oppose to allowing different civilization to flourish provided they chose not to clash.   Trump will defend our national interest but not beyond that. 

Trump like Reagan is now seeing the whole forest as oppose to the trees, as he begins to refocus America.  Whereas George W Bush viewed the world through the lens that democracy can spread and it was the desire of humans everywhere, Trump view is that each nation needs to find their own path within their own culture as long as they stay in their lane.  Trade is an issue where things need to be equal and trade deals should at least benefit American workers. He is not a free trader in the classical sense but willing to expand  trade as long as it is fair.  Call it liberalized fair trade and finally he wants a fair deal for the middle class and end to insanity of unlimited open borders, girls compete with girls in sports, and pride in America.  Like Reagan, Trump views Americas best days are ahead of it. 

Confronting the Iranian Threat: 

A Clear-Eyed Assessment of Americas Post-1979 Policy Toward Iran and the Case for Strategic Strength

By Tom Donelson and George Landrith

Executive Summary:

Since 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has waged an undeclared war against the United States and its allies, using terrorism, proxy militias, cyber operations, and nuclear brinkmanship. Despite this persistent aggression, successive U.S. administrations—particularly under Barack Obama and Joe Biden—have sought accommodation rather than confrontation, providing Iran with financial windfalls and diplomatic cover that have fueled its regional campaigns of violence.

By contrast, President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy—grounded in economic sanctions, targeted military action, and the forging of regional alliances—reversed Iran’s momentum. The killing of Qassem Soleimani, the withdrawal from the JCPOA, and the Abraham Accords restored American deterrence and reshaped the Middle East’s balance of power without dragging the U.S. into new wars.

In 2025, with Iran racing toward nuclear breakout, Trump authorized targeted strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. These actions, far from reckless, were constitutionally justified, strategically necessary, and ultimately stabilizing. They bought time, degraded Iran’s capabilities, and helped create the conditions for regional de-escalation.

This paper argues that peace is not achieved through appeasement, but through resolve. Trump’s foreign policy—realist, principled, and forceful—offers the only credible model for containing Iran and protecting U.S. interests in a dangerous world.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction: A War We Didn’t Recognize
  2. Iran’s Four-Decade War on America and Its Allies
  3. The Obama-Biden Years: Appeasement and Enablement
  4. The Trump Doctrine: Peace Through Strength
  5. Biden’s Reversal: Reinvigorating a Terror State
  6. Recent Developments: Strikes and Ceasefire Prospects
  7. On the Constitutional Authority of the President to Use Force
  8. Strategic Lessons and the Way Forward
  9. Conclusion: The Choice Between War and Peace Is a Choice Between Weakness and Resolve

I.  Introduction: A War We Didnt Recognize

We have been at war with Iran since 1979, although most Americans have not realized it. From the moment Iranian revolutionaries seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 52 Americans hostage for 444 days, the Islamic Republic declared its enmity toward the United States and its allies. What followed was not a traditional war with armies on defined battlefields, but a sustained campaign of proxy violence, terror attacks, cyber warfare, and global destabilization orchestrated from Tehran.

Over four decades, Iran has armed, trained, and funded terrorist groups across the Middle East—including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. These proxies have killed American soldiers, diplomats, civilians, and our allies. Iran has also violently suppressed its own people, imprisoned dissidents, executed political opponents, and pursued nuclear weapons while chanting “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.”

Despite this unrelenting aggression, many U.S. leaders, particularly in Democratic administrations, have treated Iran as a misunderstood adversary rather than what it plainly is: a rogue regime with global ambitions rooted in religious extremism and anti-Western ideology.

This white paper is a sober assessment of Iran’s four-decade war on America, the failures of appeasement under Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the success of Donald Trump’s maximum pressure strategy, and the path forward based on realism, deterrence, and national interest.

II.  Irans Four-Decade War on America and Its Allies

Since 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has used terrorism, proxy militias, and asymmetric warfare as core instruments of state policy. The regime’s goal has never been merely survival—it has sought regional hegemony and the destruction of Israel and the United States. What follows is a non-exhaustive but representative timeline of Iranian aggression.

1979–1981: The Hostage Crisis

The war began with the Iranian seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979. Fifty-two Americans were held hostage for 444 days in a direct violation of international law. This brazen act set the tone for Tehran’s foreign policy—ideologically driven, contemptuous of the West, and unapologetically lawless.

1980s: Terrorism in Lebanon and Beyond

In the early 1980s, Iran helped form and fund Hezbollah in Lebanon. The group quickly became a key proxy and was responsible for devastating attacks against Americans:

  • April 1983: Hezbollah bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people, including 17 Americans.
  • October 1983: A suicide truck bomb destroyed the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 American servicemen—at that time, the worst single-day loss of U.S. Marines since World War II.
  • 1984: Another bombing struck the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut, killing 24.
  • 1985: Hezbollah hijacked TWA Flight 847, murdered U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem, and held passengers hostage for 17 days.

1990s: Escalation Abroad

  • 1996: The IRGC-supported group Hezbollah al-Hejaz conducted the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. Air Force personnel and injuring nearly 500 others. A U.S. federal court later held Iran responsible for the attack.

2000s: Ties to al-Qaeda and Global Terrorism

Although Iran is a Shiite regime, it has supported Sunni terrorist organizations when strategically useful. U.S. courts have found that:

  • Iran materially supported al-Qaeda in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 224 people.
  • Iran aided operatives involved in the 2000 USS Cole bombing (17 U.S. sailors killed).
  • Iran helped facilitate travel for al-Qaeda terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks, allowing them to cross its borders without passports.

2003–2011: U.S. Troops Targeted in Iraq

During the Iraq War, Iran-backed militias—including Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Badr Corps—waged war on U.S. and coalition forces. These militias used EFPs (explosively formed penetrators) and IEDs supplied by Iran. Hundreds of American troops were killed or maimed by Iranian-designed weapons.

2019–2020: Soleimani, Embassy Attacks, and Missile Retaliation

  • December 2019: Kata’ib Hezbollah fired rockets at the K-1 base in Kirkuk, killing a U.S. contractor and injuring American personnel.
  • December 31, 2019: Iranian-backed militias attacked the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
  • January 3, 2020: In response, the Trump administration authorized the killing of Qassem Soleimani, head of the Quds Force, in a drone strike in Baghdad.
  • January 8, 2020: Iran retaliated by firing ballistic missiles at Ain al-Asad and Erbil airbases, injuring at least 110 U.S. troops.

2023–2024: Proxy Escalation Across the Region

From late 2023 through 2024, Iran’s proxies launched over 170 drone, missile, and rocket attacks on U.S. positions in Iraq and Syria:

  • October 2023: Drone strike on al-Tanf base, injuring 20 U.S. and allied personnel.
  • November 2023: Missile strike on al-Asad airbase injured 8 coalition troops.
  • January 2024: Rocket barrage caused multiple injuries and increased defensive deployments.

Houthis and Maritime Attacks

Iran’s proxy in Yemen, the Houthis, launched more than 170 attacks on shipping and naval assets in the Red Sea between late 2023 and early 2025:

  • January 15, 2024: A Houthi missile struck the U.S.-owned M/V Gibraltar Eagle, injuring crew.
  • Multiple U.S. Navy ships—USS Carney, USS Laboon, among others—intercepted Houthi missiles or drones in active combat zones.

Assassination and Kidnapping Plots

Iran has also targeted individuals on U.S. soil:

  • 2021: U.S. authorities foiled a plot to kidnap Masih Alinejad, an Iranian-American journalist.
  • 2022: DOJ charged an IRGC agent with plotting to assassinate John Bolton; similar threats were made against Mike Pompeo and other Trump-era officials.

2025: Renewed Attacks After Nuclear Facility Strikes

Following U.S. and Israeli operations against Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025, Iran’s militias resumed attacks on U.S. assets, particularly in Iraq and Syria. The Houthis further escalated maritime attacks. These responses confirmed Iran’s continued commitment to proxy warfare and regional destabilization.

III.  The Obama-Biden Years: Appeasement and Enablement

While Iran’s aggression remained constant, the U.S. posture toward Tehran shifted dramatically during the Obama administration. Rather than holding Iran accountable, the Obama-Biden foreign policy establishment sought to integrate the regime into the international community through engagement and economic incentives—an approach that proved naive, counterproductive, and dangerous.

The JCPOA: A Deal That Empowered the Enemy

In 2015, President Obama finalized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, along with Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China. Heralded by supporters as a historic achievement to prevent Iranian nuclear proliferation, the agreement was riddled with weaknesses:

  • Sunset clauses guaranteed that key nuclear restrictions would expire within 10–15 years.
  • The deal excluded Iran’s ballistic missile program, a critical delivery system for nuclear weapons.
  • Iran was allowed to self-inspect suspected military sites under certain conditions.
  • Iran received a $150 billion windfall in unfrozen assets and relief from crippling sanctions.
  • The U.S. sent Iran pallets of cash in foreign currency totaling $1.7 billion, allegedly to settle a pre-revolution arms deal.

Instead of moderating Iran’s behavior, the JCPOA funded its terror machine. Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Assad’s regime in Syria all benefited. Iran’s regional influence surged, and its anti-American, anti-Israel activities increased—not decreased.

As even critics within the Obama administration later acknowledged, Iran’s leaders never intended to become a “normal” state. They simply took the cash and bought more missiles, proxies, and centrifuges.

Bidens Continuation of a Failed Policy

As vice president, Joe Biden had supported the JCPOA. As president, he tried to revive it—even after Iran repeatedly violated the agreement, enriched uranium beyond allowed thresholds, and obstructed international inspectors.

In practice, Biden’s policies resembled Obama’s, but with fewer results:

  • He eased enforcement of oil sanctions, allowing Iran to profit from black-market sales.
  • His administration released or unfroze billions in Iranian assets, including a $6 billion transfer in 2023 for a hostage swap.
  • Despite Iranian attacks on U.S. troops and allies, Biden refused to hold Tehran accountable militarily.

The consequences were immediate and predictable:

  • Iranian proxies grew bolder in Iraq, Syria, Gaza, and Yemen.
  • Hamas launched mass rocket attacks against Israel.
  • Hezbollah threatened war from Lebanon.
  • The Houthis disrupted global trade routes in the Red Sea.
  • Iran raced toward weapons-grade uranium enrichment, shrinking its “breakout time” to mere weeks.

Biden’s policy—grounded in the illusion that engagement could change the nature of the regime—reinvigorated Iran’s terror state. The U.S. signaled weakness, and Iran responded with escalation.

IV.  The Trump Doctrine:  Peace Through Strength

In sharp contrast to the appeasement and strategic wishful thinking of the Obama-Biden years, President Donald J. Trump adopted a realist, America First foreign policy that confronted Iran with clarity, courage, and consequences. Trump understood that the Iranian regime respects only power—and that attempts to negotiate from a position of weakness only embolden tyrants.

Withdrawal from the JCPOA

In May 2018, President Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA. He rightly called it a “horrible, one-sided deal that should never, ever have been made.” This decision reasserted U.S. sovereignty and credibility, and it ended the charade that Tehran was a good-faith negotiating partner.

Trump immediately reimposed all prior sanctions and initiated what became known as the maximum pressure campaign, aimed at crushing the regime’s ability to fund terror and develop nuclear weapons.

The Maximum Pressure Strategy

Trump’s sanctions targeted:

  • Iran’s Central Bank
  • Petrochemical and energy sectors
  • Shipping, aviation, and metals
  • Key individuals in the IRGC and Quds Force

The result: Iran’s economy contracted by nearly 10%, oil exports plummeted by over 75%, and the regime lost tens of billions in annual revenues. These funds had previously been used to fund Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other militias.

As Victor Davis Hanson noted, Trump’s approach wasn’t isolationist or reckless—it was populist and nationalist, rooted in a cost-benefit analysis of U.S. interests. He wasn’t interested in remaking the Middle East but in protecting Americans and forcing adversaries to respect U.S. power.

The Killing of Qassem Soleimani

On January 3, 2020, President Trump authorized the targeted strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC-Quds Force. Soleimani was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American troops and had orchestrated attacks across the region for decades.

His death:

  • Disrupted Iran’s command structure abroad.
  • Sent a clear deterrent signal to Iran and other adversaries.
  • Was carried out with precision, without drawing the U.S. into a new war.

Contrary to media hysteria, the strike prevented future attacks rather than provoking new ones. Iran’s immediate response—a missile strike on U.S. bases that caused injuries but no deaths—was largely performative and carefully calibrated to avoid U.S. retaliation.

The Abraham Accords

While applying pressure to Iran, Trump also pursued peace elsewhere. The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, normalized diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab states, including the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. This historic achievement:

  • United moderate Sunni states and Israel in a regional alliance against Iran.
  • Demonstrated that peace did not require surrender to Tehran or endless conflict with Israel.
  • Achieved what decades of State Department orthodoxy and appeasement had failed to do.

It was a triumph of realism over ideology—and it occurred without a single U.S. troop being deployed or a shot being fired.

A Doctrinal Return to Strategic Clarity

Trump’s approach mirrored the Weinberger Doctrine, formulated after the Vietnam War:

  1. Use force only when vital national interests are at stake.
  2. Use overwhelming force and clear objectives.
  3. Commit fully or not at all.
  4. Pursue diplomatic solutions first.
  5. Reassess and adapt.
  6. Ensure public support.

Trump’s Iran policy met these standards. He avoided endless wars, kept American troops safe, supported allies, and used diplomacy backed by strength. In short, he restored deterrence.

V.  Bidens Reversal: Reinvigorating a Terror State

In one of the most dangerous foreign policy reversals in modern American history, President Joe Biden dismantled the Trump-era maximum pressure campaign against Iran. Instead of building on a position of strength, the Biden administration reverted to the failed policies of appeasement, naively attempting to resuscitate the JCPOA and normalize relations with Tehran.

The results were swift and dire: Iran resumed its regional aggression, escalated attacks through proxies, and advanced its nuclear program to dangerous levels.

Easing of Sanctions and Economic Windfalls

Upon taking office, Biden signaled an eagerness to return to the JCPOA—even as Iran openly violated the deal’s provisions. Though formal re-entry was never achieved, Biden’s administration deliberately relaxed sanctions enforcement, allowing Iran to significantly increase oil sales, particularly to China.

This flood of revenue—estimated in the tens of billions of dollars—revitalized Iran’s military, subsidized its terrorist proxies, and undercut U.S. leverage. At a time when Iran should have been weakened, Biden strengthened it.

In 2023, the administration agreed to release $6 billion in frozen Iranian assets in exchange for the return of five American hostages. While the deal was portrayed as a humanitarian gesture, it set a dangerous precedent: rewarding hostage-taking with billions in ransom.

Strategic Passivity Amid Escalation

Even as Iranian-backed militias launched over 170 attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria between 2023 and 2024, Biden’s military response was restrained and delayed. American deterrence began to crumble.

At the same time, the Houthis escalated their maritime campaign in the Red Sea, targeting international shipping and directly threatening U.S. naval vessels. The administration’s response was largely reactive, consisting of limited defensive strikes rather than a cohesive strategy to eliminate the threat.

The failure to respond forcefully emboldened Iran’s proxies and endangered American and allied lives.

Nuclear Breakout and IAEA Violations

Perhaps most troublingly, Iran raced toward nuclear weapons capability under Biden’s watch. By 2024, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran had enriched uranium to near weapons-grade purity—far beyond the JCPOA’s limits.

Biden’s response? Renewed calls for negotiations.

Even as the regime refused to cooperate with inspectors, barred access to sites, and enriched uranium beyond 60%, the administration clung to the illusion that diplomacy alone could resolve the crisis. In doing so, it allowed Iran to shrink its nuclear breakout time to weeks—placing the region and the world at risk.

Undermining U.S. Credibility

While Iran rearmed and threatened regional war, the Biden administration signaled weakness:

  • It slow-walked military responses.
  • It engaged in public criticism of Israel while placating Iran.
  • It allowed Iran to believe it could act with impunity.

This erosion of American deterrence undermined not only security in the Middle East, but also U.S. credibility worldwide—from Eastern Europe to the Indo-Pacific.

VI. Recent Developments: Strikes and Ceasefire Prospects

By early 2025, it had become clear that Iran was approaching the nuclear threshold. Intelligence reports indicated that Iran had stockpiled enriched uranium at levels perilously close to weapons-grade purity and had begun testing advanced centrifuge designs. The regime’s escalation—combined with its persistent attacks on U.S. and Israeli interests through proxies—reached a tipping point.

In response, both the United States and Israel launched a series of coordinated strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Though not publicly acknowledged in full detail, the attacks involved a combination of cyber warfare, sabotage, air strikes, and covert operations targeting Iran’s most sensitive nuclear sites, including Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.

Objectives and Outcomes

The primary goals of these strikes were to:

  1. Destroy key centrifuge facilities and uranium enrichment capabilities.
  2. Delay Iran’s ability to achieve nuclear breakout.
  3. Deter further Iranian escalation or proxy aggression.
  4. Reassert red lines after years of diplomatic ambiguity.

Initial assessments indicate that the strikes succeeded in crippling Iran’s nuclear timeline and forced Tehran to recalibrate. The damage to physical infrastructure, combined with internal unrest and mounting economic pressures, limited Iran’s options for escalation.

Proxy Reaction and Containment

In the aftermath of the strikes, Iranian proxies—particularly in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen—increased attacks on U.S. and allied positions, attempting to retaliate without triggering a full-scale war. These attacks included:

  • Rocket and drone strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq.
  • Maritime drone assaults in the Red Sea by Houthi forces.
  • Renewed threats from Hezbollah along Israel’s northern border.

However, the U.S. response was swift and calibrated, focusing on counterforce operations rather than full-scale invasions. The emphasis remained on destroying capabilities, not occupying territory—a key feature of the Trump-era military philosophy.

Signs of Ceasefire and De-Escalation

Ironically, the bold strikes—while escalating tensions in the short term—helped create the conditions for de-escalation. Iran found itself:

  • Militarily degraded.
  • Economically strained.
  • Facing widespread domestic dissent.
  • Increasingly isolated diplomatically.

By mid-2025, quiet diplomatic channels began to open between regional powers seeking to stabilize Yemen, reduce Houthi activity, and prevent a broader war. Early signs of progress included:

  • Provisional ceasefire talks in Yemen.
  • Reduced Houthi attacks on shipping.
  • Increased international inspections in Iranian nuclear sites—under pressure, not invitation.

These developments confirmed a central truth of international relations: peace is not achieved through appeasement, but through the assertive use of force when justified and the strategic application of leverage.

VII. On the Constitutional Authority of the President to Use Force

In the wake of President Trump’s 2025 strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, some political opponents claimed that the action was unconstitutional and grounds for impeachment. These criticisms were not only disingenuous—they were historically and legally absurd.

The Commander-in-Chief Clause

Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution designates the President as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. This role grants the President the authority to direct military operations, respond to imminent threats, and take action to defend U.S. interests—without first obtaining congressional approval for every tactical decision.

While the Constitution reserves to Congress the power to “declare war,” this has never been interpreted as requiring prior approval for every military engagement or strike. Historically, U.S. Presidents have used military force hundreds of times without formal declarations of war—from Jefferson’s action against the Barbary Pirates to modern-day precision strikes against terrorist threats.

Precedent: Obama, Biden, and Presidential Force

President Barack Obama dropped over 26,000 bombs in 2016 alone, according to Pentagon data. These operations included airstrikes in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—without formal declarations of war and often without prior congressional authorization. Yet no serious legal scholar or Democratic leader proposed impeaching Obama for these actions.

Similarly, President Joe Biden has ordered airstrikes in Syria and Iraq during his term, targeting Iranian-backed militias following attacks on U.S. forces. Again, no impeachment was discussed, because Biden, like all modern presidents, exercised his lawful authority as commander in chief.

Trumps Actions: Lawful, Targeted, and Justified

President Trump’s 2025 strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities followed the same legal and constitutional framework:

  • The action was targeted and limited, designed to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
  • It was conducted in defense of U.S. interests and international security.
  • The President informed Congress afterward, in accordance with the War Powers Resolution of 1973.

To suggest that such action constitutes an impeachable offense is not just partisan—it reflects a basic misunderstanding of constitutional governance. As one commentator observed, “This argument is so weak that even a civics student would know better.”

Selective Outrage and Political Hypocrisy

That some Democrats condemned Trump’s strikes as impeachable, while defending or ignoring similar (and often broader) use of force by Obama and Biden, reveals a dangerous double standard. It suggests that, for many, principle matters less than politics.

Fortunately, not all Democrats joined the chorus of hysteria. A handful praised Trump’s action as “strong” or “decisive,” recognizing that preventing a nuclear-armed Iran serves not just Republicans or conservatives—but the entire free world.

VIII. Strategic Lessons and the Way Forward

Four decades of American engagement with Iran have revealed a hard but essential truth: the Islamic Republic does not want coexistence—it wants dominance. Its regime views diplomacy not as a path to peace, but as a tactic to buy time, extract concessions, and continue its revolution.

American policy must therefore be grounded not in wishful thinking, but in strategic clarity and moral realism. The experience of the Obama-Biden and Trump administrations provides a stark contrast and a valuable roadmap.

Lesson 1: Appeasement Fails

Attempts to “moderate” Iran through economic incentives, diplomatic engagement, or non-binding agreements have repeatedly failed. The JCPOA and similar initiatives empowered Iran without changing its behavior. The regime simply used Western funds to advance its goals: supporting terrorism, repressing its own people, and developing nuclear weapons.

Any future policy must reject the illusion that Iran will reform itself if simply shown goodwill. Appeasement emboldens tyrants.

Lesson 2: Pressure Works

President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign—rooted in sanctions, isolation, and targeted force—weakened Iran more effectively than any policy since the revolution. It disrupted their funding networks, limited their ability to wage proxy wars, and restored deterrence.

The killing of Qassem Soleimani demonstrated that red lines would be enforced. The Abraham Accords built a regional alliance without conceding to Iran. Strength, not surrender, opened doors to peace.

Lesson 3: Regime Change Must Come from Within

While some argue that the U.S. should seek to overthrow the Iranian regime, President Trump recognized that regime change cannot be imposed by foreign armies. The best path forward lies in:

  • Supporting dissident voices inside Iran.
  • Amplifying the regime’s human rights abuses on the world stage.
  • Maintaining economic and diplomatic pressure to expose the regime’s failure.
  • Strengthening regional allies to contain Iran’s influence.

The Iranian people—not the U.S. military—must be the agents of their own liberation. Our job is to create the conditions in which that transformation can take place.

Lesson 4: The Role of Strategic Doctrine

As President Trump’s policies demonstrated, the Weinberger Doctrine remains a valuable framework for modern American engagement:

  1. Act only when vital national interests are at stake.
  2. Use overwhelming force with clear objectives.
  3. Avoid half-measures and mission creep.
  4. Exhaust diplomacy—but don’t rely on it blindly.
  5. Continually reassess and adapt.
  6. Seek public support for any sustained operation.

This doctrine offers America First foreign policy advocates a path to avoid both reckless entanglements and dangerous passivity.

IX.  Conclusion: The Choice Between War and Peace Is a Choice Between Weakness and Resolve

Critics of President Trump frequently warned that his strong stance on Iran would lead to World War III. They accused him of recklessness, of warmongering, of triggering global instability. Yet the facts speak for themselves: during his presidency, there were no new wars. Iran was weakened, not emboldened. U.S. troops were safer, not more endangered. Peace, not war, was the fruit of strategic strength.

Contrast this with the Obama-Biden years, when appeasement emboldened terrorists, Iran advanced its nuclear program, and American deterrence collapsed. From the JCPOA to the unreciprocated diplomacy of Biden’s first term, the lesson was repeated: diplomacy without leverage invites disaster.

The Trump Doctrine worked not because it was ideological, but because it was grounded in realism, history, and common sense. It recognized that Iran’s regime cannot be reformed with cash, cannot be trusted with nuclear capabilities, and cannot be reasoned into abandoning its core mission of exporting radicalism and terror.

The strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2025—a lawful, justified, and necessary action—was not an act of war. It was an act of prevention. It delayed nuclear breakout. It reestablished red lines. And, importantly, it helped set the conditions for regional de-escalation and possible ceasefires. As in previous chapters of American history, strength brought stability.

For all the criticism, President Trump’s Iran policy offers a case study in successful statecraft:

  • Clear objectives
  • Measured use of force
  • Economic pressure over military occupation
  • Respect for American lives and interests first

Peace does not come from hoping the enemy will change. It comes from ensuring they have no choice.

If America is to protect its people, its allies, and its future, it must return to this clarity of purpose. A nuclear Iran is not inevitable. Terrorism is not unstoppable. Appeasement is not diplomacy. And weakness is not peace.

America must once again lead—not with apologies or concessions, but with strength, resolve, and moral clarity.

Strategic Tariff Policy:  Promoting Prosperity Among Allies and Containing Totalitarian Ambitions

By George Landrith, President, Frontiers of Freedom Institute

In an age of rising authoritarianism and economic interdependence, the question of how the United States should conduct its trade policy is not merely one of dollars and cents — it is a matter of national security, moral clarity, and global leadership. The current global system requires a differentiated approach: one that rewards cooperation and punishes coercion. While the U.S. should pursue zero or near-zero tariffs with allies and like-minded democracies, it must maintain — and in many cases increase — trade barriers with regimes that weaponize trade to undermine sovereignty, expand authoritarian influence, or use their profits from international trade to fund unjustified wars and aggression against their neighbors, or fund terrorism around the globe. 

The United States has long championed the virtues of free trade, and rightly so. When conducted among democratic allies who share a commitment to the rule of law, human rights, and peaceful coexistence, free trade is an engine of prosperity and peace. Lowering or eliminating tariffs among such nations not only boosts economic growth but strengthens the fabric of a free and open international order.

However, the same tools that build mutual prosperity among friends can be weaponized by authoritarian regimes bent on domination and exporting terrorism. Nations like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have demonstrated a willingness to use trade, shipping, and economic leverage as instruments of coercion and control. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, for example, is not merely a trade plan — it is a strategy for global dominance that exploits economic dependence to bend nations to its will. In such cases, the United States must respond with strength and strategy. This means imposing tariffs and other trade barriers that blunt the power of economic warfare, incentivize American companies to re-shore or diversify their supply chains, and prevent our allies from falling prey to authoritarian chokeholds.

The complexity of the various goals with regard to trade policy — to promote economic growth and economic benefits among free nations, while at the same time making it more difficult for totalitarian regimes to fund wars against their neighbors, or fund and export terrorism, or to engage in economic warfare around the globe — a two-tiered approach to global trade policy is needed:  one that promotes zero tariffs among trusted allies to foster mutual prosperity and another that uses strategic tariffs against hostile regimes to counteract their imperial ambitions. By aligning trade policy with national values and strategic interests, America can build a stronger economy at home, a more resilient alliance abroad, and a freer world for generations to come.

The bottom line is that drawing from history, economics, and real-world case studies, it becomes clear that free trade among friends promotes peace and prosperity, while free trade with adversaries must be constrained to prevent exploitation, coercion, and imperialism. 

The Value of Free Trade Among Friends

The economic arguments for free trade are well-established. Free trade allows nations to specialize in areas of comparative advantage, leading to increased efficiency, lower costs, and greater prosperity. Historically, the lowering of trade barriers among Western nations has fueled growth and innovation. The post-World War II liberal economic order — anchored by institutions like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO) — helped the free world rebuild and flourish.

But free trade is more than an economic concept — it is both a practical and a political principle. When democratic nations trade freely, they are not only exchanging goods and services; they are reinforcing bonds of mutual trust and shared values. Trade among allies supports the development of robust middle classes, strengthens civil institutions, and reduces the incentives for conflict. In short, it helps build a peaceful international order.

Trade liberalization among democracies has produced decades of growth. Even a mediocre trade agreement like NAFTA, let to trade among the NAFTA parties growing from $290 billion in 1993 to over $1.2 trillion by 2021.1 The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), in effect since 2012, increased American exports to South Korea by nearly 50% over its first five years.2

These economic gains are not confined to GDP. They reflect strategic alignment: shared standards, transparent institutions, respect for rule of law, and protection of intellectual property. By lowering barriers among friendly nations, the United States can encourage innovation, strengthen allies’ economies, and reduce global dependence on authoritarian states.

For these reasons, the United States should pursue near-zero tariffs with its closest allies: Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union and NATO nations, Japan, South Korea, Morocco, Israel, and emerging partners like India, the Philippines, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia. Such agreements would not only benefit American workers and consumers, but also create an economic bloc strong enough to withstand coercion from authoritarian regimes.

Tariffs as Strategic Tools Against Hostile Regimes

While free trade works well among friends, it can be disastrous when extended to adversaries who reject the rules of fair competition and wield economic tools to advance totalitarian aims. Authoritarian regimes view trade not as a partnership, but as a pressure point. For them, commerce is a tool of control, not cooperation. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have repeatedly used trade relationships to coerce neighbors, undermine global norms, fund unjustified threats and wars against their neighbors, export terrorism, and gain asymmetric advantages.

China, in particular, presents a sobering case study in how a nation can use trade and investment to undermine the global order. Under the guise of development, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has ensnared dozens of countries in debt traps, forced infrastructure dependencies, and undermined local governance. Through control of ports, railroads, and shipping lanes, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is constructing a new kind of empire — one based not on traditional military conquest, but on strategic economic entanglement. In Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and even parts of Europe, China now exerts influence not because of shared values or fair competition, but because of raw economic leverage.

Under the Belt and Road Initiative, China has funded roads, ports, and railways in over 100 countries. But these are not gifts — they are loans with strings. In Sri Lanka, the inability to service Chinese debt forced the government to hand over Hambantota Port in a 99-year lease.3 In Africa, Chinese-financed projects have brought accusations of neo-colonialism and environmental abuse.

Moreover, China routinely uses trade as leverage. After Australia called for an independent inquiry into COVID-19’s origins, China retaliated with tariffs and import bans on Australian wine, beef, and barley.4 Lithuania faced similar punishment after opening a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius.5 These acts make it clear: Beijing views trade as a weapon.

For years, Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas muted its response to Moscow’s aggression. Germany, the EU’s largest economy, built energy policy on the faulty premise that economic engagement with Russia would lead to liberalization. Instead, the Nord Stream pipelines gave Vladimir Putin both revenue and leverage. Only after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine did Europe begin to unwind this dangerous dependency.6

Iran uses its oil revenues to fund regional terror proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. Despite crippling sanctions, it continues to trade with sympathetic regimes — often through illicit channels — undermining regional stability. North Korea, though more isolated, uses its limited trade and cybercrime to finance its weapons programs which it uses to threaten many nations across the globe. Neither regime participates in global trade in good faith.

To ignore this would be dangerously naïve. The United States must treat trade with such regimes not as an economic opportunity, but as a strategic threat. Tariffs are one of the few tools that democratic nations can use to push back against this aggression without direct military conflict. By raising the cost of doing business with China, we can create disincentives for American companies to invest in a nation that seeks to control and ultimately undermine us.

The Dual Role of Tariffs: Economic Protection and Strategic Defense

Critics of tariffs often portray them as purely protectionist, economically harmful, or counterproductive. While blanket, arbitrary tariffs can indeed have negative effects, when used strategically — as levers of negotiation or tools of deterrence — they can be profoundly effective. 

Simply stated, traditional free market economic theory often opposes tariffs, arguing they distort markets and harm consumers. In a vacuum, that may be true. But in the real world, where states pursue geopolitical advantage through trade, tariffs are sometimes necessary tools of statecraft.

President Donald Trump demonstrated this with his bold trade policies, particularly his approach to China. President Donald Trump’s use of tariffs — particularly against China—demonstrated their value as leverage. By imposing Section 301 tariffs, the Trump administration targeted sectors implicated in intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, and subsidies to state-owned enterprises.7 These measures prompted a reevaluation of China’s role in global supply chains.

With respect to China, Trump’s tariffs served a broader geopolitical purpose. By making it more costly to manufacture and import Chinese goods, these policies encouraged U.S. firms to move production either back to the United States or to more reliable trading partners such as Vietnam, India, Indonesia and the Philippines. This realignment is crucial. Not only does it reduce dependence on a hostile power, but it strengthens the economies of democratic allies and diversifies the global supply chain.

Tariffs also set the stage for renegotiated and improved trade deals.  For example, the tariffs Trump implemented and threatened allowed the U.S. to renegotiate NAFTA into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), a deal that ensured stronger protections for American labor, tighter enforcement of trade rules, and greater access to markets.8 Though controversial at the time, the use of tariffs produced tangible gains and began reorienting American trade policy toward strategic objectives.

Nonetheless, unilateral action can only go so far. There is a risk that, in response to U.S. tariffs, China may dump its excess products — steel, solar panels, batteries, clothing, and more — into allied markets at below-market prices, eroding industries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. To prevent this, the United States must coordinate its tariff strategy with its partners. Just as NATO provides collective defense against military aggression, a multilateral trade strategy can defend against China’s economic coercion.

Strengthening the Economic Front of the Free World

Economic strength is a prerequisite for national security. A country that relies on hostile regimes for essential goods — such as pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, energy, or rare earth minerals — is not truly sovereign. America’s trade policy should reflect this reality.

But security does not require isolation. On the contrary, we should be deepening economic ties with nations that share our values and geopolitical interests. By reducing tariffs, increasing investment, and promoting innovation within this trusted circle, the United States can lead the creation of a new economic alliance — one based not on coercion, but on cooperation.

One benefit of strategic tariffs is the acceleration of reshoring and “friendshoring” — moving production out of adversarial countries and into domestic or allied economies. American firms, in response to tariffs and rising Chinese labor costs, have shifted operations to Vietnam, India, and Mexico.9 These shifts enhance supply chain resilience and reduce vulnerability to economic blackmail.

The U.S. should also invest in capacity-building programs to help allies develop their own industries and infrastructure. For example, redirecting supply chains away from China will only succeed if nations like India and Vietnam can scale production and logistics. A targeted, values-based foreign aid program focused on industrial development could go a long way in achieving this. In the long term, a world in which the United States and its allies supply each other, rather than being dependent on authoritarian powers, is not only more prosperous, but far more stable and secure.

Historical Lessons: The Cold War and Economic Containment

During the Cold War, the U.S. recognized the danger of economically empowering adversaries. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) restricted Western technology transfers to the Soviet bloc. The Marshall Plan, by contrast, aimed to revive Western Europe economically, creating a bulwark against communism. The logic was simple: economic strength undergirds political freedom.

Today’s authoritarian regimes should be met with the same moral clarity. Totalitarian powers should not be allowed to exploit free markets while suppressing their own people and threatening their neighbors.

Coordinating With Allies to Maximize Impact

Strategic tariffs are most likely effective if coordinated and implemented multilaterally. If the U.S. imposes tariffs on China, but Europe and Southeast Asia increase trade with Beijing, the effect is diluted or reversed. Worse, Chinese goods diverted from American markets may flood allied economies, undercutting their industries. Coordinated tariff and investment policies among allies would ensure that China cannot shift its exports to friendlier markets and undercut their domestic industries.

The U.S. must lead a global coalition of democracies with a unified trade strategy. This could include:

  • A Democratic Trade Alliance that lowers tariffs among member states.
  • A Digital Trade Charter to combat cyber-espionage and protect Intellectual Property as China is the leading thief of intellectual property.
  • Joint investment funds for critical infrastructure in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to counter the influence of the CCP’s Belt and Road Initiative designed to create international choke points for China’s advantage. 
  • Multilateral enforcement of labor and environmental standards, barring products made with forced labor or ecological abuse.

The United States should actively promote tariff-free or low-tariff trade among members of the free world. This would not only reward good behavior but also encourage more countries — especially emerging economies — to adopt liberal democratic principles as a path to economic prosperity. This framework would reward democratic governance and economic transparency, while isolating bad actors and evil doers. 

Addressing Critiques of Strategic Tariffs

Critics of tariffs sometimes raise valid concerns: higher prices for consumers, supply chain disruptions, and risks of retaliation. But these costs must be weighed against the strategic imperative of resisting authoritarian influence.

Moreover, some of these concerns are exaggerated. The initial inflationary effects of tariffs often level out as supply chains adjust. More importantly, the cost of dependence on authoritarian regimes — economic coercion, strategic vulnerability, and moral compromise — is far greater. For example, during World War II, I doubt anyone who valued freedom was arguing that the world should be engaging in free trade with Hitler’s Nazi regime. It makes no sense to empower those who once they obtain power will use it to enslave you and dominate you. 

Another critique is that tariffs hurt developing nations. But this is precisely why a coalition of democracies should step in to offer developing countries fairer alternatives — through investment, trade access, and technology transfer — without the strings of authoritarian loans like China does. We can build economic situations that provide profits for both sides of investment. But we can’t follow China’s model which is investment to grow only our ability to choke off other nations. 

President Trump’s trade and tariffs approach may not be absolutely perfect, but it is focused on not only helping America to be more prosperous and secure, but to work with our friends and allies to help them be more prosperous and secure, and at the same time making evil totalitarian regimes have a more difficult time funding their threats and violence against their own people and the rest of the world. This is a wise approach and hopefully he will be effective in putting these goals in practice.

The United States should always be promoting a values-based trade doctrine — one that recognizes the moral distinctions between democracies and dictatorships. Trade with friends should be open, robust, and tariff-free. Trade with adversaries must be conditional, limited, and cautious. 

Policymakers must also remain vigilant to prevent tariffs from being captured by domestic special interests or devolving into protectionism. Tariff policies should be flexible, data-driven, and tied to clear strategic goals.

This doctrine aligns with core American principles: liberty, fairness, and the rule of law. It also reflects strategic wisdom. No nation will benefit if a totalitarian power like China dominates global shipping lanes, 5G infrastructure, rare earth minerals, and AI platforms.

Economic policy is not neutral. It either reinforces democratic order or subsidizes authoritarian advance. The time for moral ambiguity is over.

Navigating the Risks and Trade-Offs

No policy is without costs. Strategic tariffs may lead to higher consumer prices in the short term. Shifting supply chains can be complex, and retaliatory tariffs from adversarial nations are always a possibility. These risks are real — but they are manageable, especially when weighed against the costs of inaction.

China’s long-term strategy is to make the world dependent on its exports, control key global infrastructure, and leverage these dependencies for political and military gain. To pretend otherwise is to engage in wishful thinking. Tariffs — when based on clear strategic principles — can act as both punishment and prevention. They can send a message: the United States will not fund its enemies, nor will it allow its allies to be economically strangled.

The ultimate goal of American trade policy should be to serve the interests of the American people while also defending the principles of freedom, democracy, and sovereignty abroad. A healthy domestic manufacturing base, strong alliances, and a diversified global supply chain are not mutually exclusive—they are mutually reinforcing.

High tariffs on China and other hostile regimes can accelerate a realignment of global trade away from authoritarian power centers. At the same time, zero or near-zero tariffs among allies will unleash innovation, lower costs, and build a foundation for collective security and prosperity.  In short, we must not treat all nations equally in trade policy—because not all nations share our values or our goals.

To ensure fairness and transparency, America’s tariff policy must be guided by a coherent framework — one that prioritizes national security, promotes democratic values, and seeks multilateral support. Tariffs should not be used impulsively, but rather as part of a long-term strategy of economic alignment with friends and economic decoupling from foes.

Conclusion

America’s trade policy must evolve to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Free trade remains a cornerstone of prosperity and international cooperation — when practiced among friends. But when weaponized by authoritarian regimes, trade becomes a tool of domination and dependence. The United States must therefore adopt a differentiated tariff strategy: one that promotes near-zero tariffs among democratic allies, and one that uses strategic trade barriers to contain and counteract totalitarian economic warfare.

This is not only an economic necessity but a moral imperative. The global future must not be shaped by the coercive power of tyrants, but by the shared prosperity of free peoples. In leading this effort, America can ensure that its trade policy not only protects its workers and industries but also safeguards the freedom and dignity of nations around the globe. We must act not just as a marketplace, but as a moral leader — building a world where liberty and prosperity go hand in hand.

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Endnotes:

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 1 Office of the United States Trade Representative. “USMCA: United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement.” https://ustr.gov/usmca.

2  U.S. Department of Commerce. “U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Outcomes.” 2020.

3 Abi-Habib, Maria. “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.” The New York Times, June 25, 2018.

4  Dziedzic, Stephen. “Australia hits back at China’s economic coercion.” ABC News (Australia), Dec. 2020. 

5  Karnitschnig, Matthew. “China punishes Lithuania for Taiwan ties.” Politico, December 2021. 

6  European Commission. “EU Imports of Energy Products – Recent Developments.” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics.

7  Bown, Chad P., and Douglas A. Irwin. “The Trump Trade War: Motivations, Manifestation, and the Future.” Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2019. 

8  White House. “Fact Sheet: USMCA Agreement.” July 2020. 

9  Sharma, Ruchir. “The Manufacturing Shift Away from China.” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2023. 

Iran, Trump and American first foreign policy

We have been at war with Iran since 1979 only most Americans  have not realized it. From the time of Iranian mullahs taking our embassy staff hostage, to many different acts of terrorism against our soldiers beginning with the 1983 attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon and during the war on terror, American soldiers died as result of Iranian efforts. Obama/Biden appeasement Iranian government giving them billions to spread their terrorism which included proxies in Lebanon and Gaza strip as well as Assad in Syria.   The reality is that Obama/Biden negotiations would have allowed Iran the bomb but in the case of Obama, long after he left office 

The entire basis of Obama/Biden was designed to create a balance of power between Iran,  Saudi’s and Israel but the absurdity of the policy could be seen in that Iran’s goal was not a balance of power but control over the Middle East and the destruction of Israel.  Brian Kennedy in America Mind observed about Iran, and American policy during the cold war, “The U.S. experience with Iran tells a different story. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been at war with the United States for almost half a century. Its enmity for the U.S. was born of our cooperation in the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 and the restoration of the Shah of Iran until his fall at the hands of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The overthrow in 1953 was part of a series of Cold War considerations that the United States made with our British allies to check the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and ensure Western access to oil…The Cold War, clearly misunderstood by so many young Americans today, was an existential contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States was not engaged in the democracy promotion that came to characterize the discredited and failed efforts of the Global War on Terrorism. During the Cold War, the United States and our NATO allies engaged in ruthless competition with the Soviet Union and its allies, such as Communist China, North Korea, and the terrorist movements represented by the PLO in the Middle East and Communist/terrorist groups in Europe such as Baader-Meinhof, Black September, and the Red Brigades. Communist China supported these groups every bit as much as the SovietUnion did. It was a global struggle for primacy.”

Our involvement with Iran was part of winning the cold war and the collapse of the Shah and its replacement with Mullah’s theocracy changed our calculations in the Middle East  and the impact would go beyond the end of Cold war.  During  the 1980’s Iraq and Iranian were engaged in war for nearly 8 years in which millions died, and we actually supported Saddam against the Iranians   Hussain invasion changed the calculations as United States would not allow the invasion to stand and United States led coalition removed Hussian from Kuwait 

Muslim scholar Robert Spencer noted the difference between Iran and Iraq, “As a consistent opponent of our misguided misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan from the beginning, I’m here to tell you that Iran in 2025 is not Iraq in 2003. Back in March 2003, I argued in an article in the late, lamented Insight magazine that President Bush did not have a realistic plan for bringing democracy to the Middle East, and that insisting that the nations of the Middle East choose between Western-style democracy or the terror state would do more harm than good.…In that article, I wrote that “certainly he will find proponents of democracy in Iraq and elsewhere. But the primary opponents of these democrats will not be terrorists, but those who hold that no government has any legitimacy unless it obeys the Shariah. Even if they lose in the short run, they will not disappear as long as there are people who take the Koran and Islamic tradition seriously. And that spells trouble for any genuine democracy.” I hate to say, “I told you so,” but I don’t hate it all that much…And now, the idea that the Islamic regime in Iran could well be in its last days is giving a lot of people who style themselves “America First” the vapors. But Iran in 2025 is pretty much the polar opposite of Iraq in 2003. Saddam’s Iraq did not enforce Sharia; ; it was a secular state, which rankled many Muslim hardliners within the country. They were itching for a chance to impose Sharia and govern the country, or as much of it as they could wrench under their control, as a proper Islamic state, and when that chance came courtesy of the Americans, they grabbed it. The Islamic State, which in its heyday controlled a territory in Iraq and Syria larger than Britain, applied Islamic law with scrupulous exactitude and remorseless efficiency. The end result, as everyone knows, was far worse than what had been seen under Saddam.”

Melanie Phillips made a similar point with a British colonial, “In London, a British colonel told me that “Ariel Sharon has his hand up Bush’s back”—and was astonished when I replied that Israel had told the United States it was Iran, not Iraq, which posed the greatest danger.”  Iraq war may have been the wrong war at wrong time with the wrong country.

Victor Davis Hanson observed about Trump policy toward Iran and in general, “Trump’s past shows that he never claimed that he was either an ideological isolationist or an interventionist. He was and is clearly a populist-nationalist: i.e., what in a cost-to-benefit analysis is in the best interests of the U.S. at home and its own particular agendas abroad? Trump did not like neo-conservatism because he never felt it was in our interests to spend blood and treasure on those who either did not deserve such largess, or who would never evolve in ways we thought they should, or whose fates were not central to our national interests.”    Hanson point is that Trump is not an isolationist but believes that our interest needs to be considered. 

In the past, I have discussed the Cap Weinberger thesis on the conditions in which American go to war.  For advocate of an America’s First foreign policy might begin reviewing the former Secretary of Defense Cap Weinberger six rules for engagement.  The principles were:

1. Forces should not be committed unless the action is vital to national interest.

2. Forces should be committed wholeheartedly with the intention of winning – or they should not be committed at all (No half-hearted commitment).

3. Forces should be committed with clearly defined political and military objectives.

4. The use of force should be the last resort (after all diplomatic initiatives have been exhausted).

5. The relationship between objectives and the force committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.

6. Before committing forces abroad (in foreign countries) there should be some reasonable assurance of public support.

Casper Weinberger set these principles in the aftermath of the Vietnam war in which America was divided and there was serious question on how the war was conducted, so he set in principle ideas that political leader needs to consider.  In 1984, two events occurred, one in which 240 Marines were killed as result of a suicide bomber in Beirut and the second, the invasion of Grenada in which United States removed a Marxist government that overthrew another leftist government and supported by Cuban forces.

The Beirut attack was part of an ill-defined peace keeping mission in Lebanon and eventually Reagan, left Lebanon as oppose to getting sucked into an endless morose and in Grenada, United States went into with overpowering force, and easily removed the Cuban forces in an island in our backyard, the Caribbean. 

The first Gulf War was influenced by this principle as United States and their alliance went into Kuwait with overwhelming force, defeated the Iraqi army easily before ending the war.  And Bush administration went to the American people and Congress to gain approval to use force if diplomacy failed in persuading Hussein to leave Kuwait.  After the failure of diplomacy, the first Gulf War commenced. 

The second Gulf War and the war on terror began with these principles but after the initial victory, the United States expanded upon the objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan to reinstitute democratic government in both countries.  From there, United States engaged in long term engagement that ended in failure in Afghanistan.  The expanded mission after the second war in Iraq ended in failure.  Robert Spencer predicted the failure of this mission and while the initial war in Afghanistan was designed to go after those responsible for 9/11 and the initial campaign succeeded in that but the movement toward pushing Afghanistan toward democracy proved problematic and Bush involved us in two wars at same time.  

The second Gulf War and the war on terror began with these principles but after the initial victory, the United States expanded upon the objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan to reinstitute democratic government in both countries.  From there, United States engaged in long term engagement that ended in failure in Afghanistan. 

An Americas First policy begins identifying what is in our national interest and what is not. Americans no longer want to be involved in endless wars without any end game, but they will follow defined goals that are attainable and convinced in our national interest.  Reagan exercised a modest foreign policy with the objective of winning the Cold War. After the cold war, we found ourselves in unique position as the World leading superpower after the Soviet Empire collapsed and China has yet to be the power they are now.  George W Bush campaigned on a modest foreign policy and even questioned nation building in Haiti but after 9/11, things change and the strategy as Bush administration decided including nation building to reverse future Islamist terrorist states. Just as Bush criticized Clinton administration for his nation building efforts in Haiti, his national building efforts to build more stable nations in the Middle East failed, certainly in Afghanistan and Biden withdrawal proved to be disastrous in allowing the Taliban back in power and Putin took this as a sign of weakness and a license to begin the invasion

What is an American first foreign policy?  If China is the main threat, then what strategy needs to be followed?  How do decoupling ourselves from China and tariffs fit in the strategy?  What alliances need to be set up and the condition of those alliances that will increase our own national interest?  What would the role of Europe and NATO play and what about our relations with India fit into our national interest?  What should our position be in Europe, and do we allow the Europeans manage the bulk of the defense of Europe against future Russian incursion?  How do we deal with Central and South America?  I could go on, but Weinberger principle gives Americas firsters a framework to build from. 

Victor Davis Hanson concluded, “So-called, optional, bad-deal, and forever wars in the Middle East and their multitrillion-dollar costs would come ultimately at the expense of shorting Middle America back home. However, Trump’s first-term bombing of ISIS, standing down “little rocket man”, warning Putin not to invade Ukraine between 2017-21, and killing off Qasem Soleimani, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and many of the attacking Russian Wagner Group in Syria were certainly not Charles Lindberg isolationism but a sort of Jacksonian—something summed up perhaps as the Gadsen “Don’t tread on me”/ or Lucius Sulla’s “No better friend, no worse enemy” . Trump’s much critiqued references to Putin—most recently during the G7, and his negotiations with him over Ukraine—were never, as alleged, appeasement (he was harder in his first term on Putin than was either Obama or Biden), but art-of-the-deal/transactional (e.g., you don’t gratuitously insult or ostracize your formidable rival in possible deal-making, but seek simultaneously to praise—and beat—him.) Similarly, Churchill initially saw the mass-murdering, treacherous Stalin in the way Trump perhaps sees Putin, someone dangerous and evil, but who if handled carefully, occasionally granted his due, and approached with eyes wide open, could be useful in advancing a country’s realist interests—which for Britain in 1941 was for Russia to kill three-quarters of Nazi Germany’s soldiers, and, mutatis mutandis, for the U.S. in 2025 to cease the mass killing near Europe, save most of an autonomous Ukraine, keep Russia back eastward as far as feasible, and in Kissingerian-style derail the developing Chinese and Russian anti-American axis. Trump was never anti-Ukraine, but rather against a seemingly endless Verdun-like war in which after three years neither side had found a pathway to strategic resolution—a war from the distance fought between two like peoples, one with nuclear weapons, and on the doorstep of Europe.”

Trump policy is not isolationist but based on restricting the use of military only in need to defend our national interest nor is he interested in spreading “democracy” but accept countries choice of government as long they do not impact our national interest.  He stated to the Saudis, ”And it’s crucial for the wider world to note this great transformation has not come from Western interventionalists or flying people in beautiful planes giving you lectures on how to live and how to govern your own affairs. No, the gleaming marvels of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not created by the so-called nation-builders, neocons, or liberal nonprofits like those who spent trillions and trillions of dollars failing to develop Kabul, Baghdad, so many other cities… Instead, the birth of a modern Middle East has been brought by the people of the region themselves, the people that are right here, the people that have lived here all their lives — developing your own sovereign countries, pursuing your own unique visions, and charting your own destinies in your own way. It’s really incredible what you’ve done.”

Trump view is that countries need to find their own path and as long as those paths don’t involved threatening the United States  Trump view that each region or countries need to find their own way and we can’t impose our views or system upon others.  As Brian Kennedy noted about our alliance in World War II  included the Soviet Union and , we allied ourselves with unsavory countries to defeat the Soviet Empire, but also many countries like South Korea found their own path to both economic and political freedom as we aided the process but not start the process for it was their people who started the process and move toward democracy on their own.

Postscript,

As I was completing  this piece, Trump bombed the nuclear facilities and now we will see where we go  The Weinberger doctrine would limit Trump responses beginning with understanding the limits of what the United States can do.  Trump is not interested in boots on the ground, but Trump administration needs to be prepared for Iranians counterattack including shutting down the Strait of Hormuz or terrorist activities in the Unted States with undetected cells. 

Trump had a good beginning a limited objective, destroy Iranian nuclear facilities and as for regime change, it would be good if the mullahs were replaced but the United States can not be involved instituting regime change nor have boots on the ground. Iranian people themselves must change their government.   Trump has made his feeling known on this.

Iran Israel and Obama/Biden

The Israel attack on Iran and the subsequent Iranian counterattack, can be traced to Barack Obama policies toward Iran. A policy based on the idea that Iran could be a constructive force in the Middle East and a counter force to our alliance with Israel. Stupidity.

Obama and Biden allowed Iran access to billions which went to expanding their terrorist network throughout Middle East and when Iranian people rebelled in 2009, Obama took the regime side. And when Trump had Iran on the economic rope in 2020, Biden open the spigot.

The October 7th attack was a direct result of Obama/Biden policies.

The little secret is that Trump had to clean up the Obama mistakes of his administration and now Trump is cleaning up Biden mess. A major European war in Central Europe, the Middle East mess and China on the march in the Western Pacific that is what Trump inherited.

Israeli took Iran situation in their own hands but there is enough evidence that United States knew what was up and didn’t object. Trump did his peace talk but makes you wonder if this was designed a fake since Trump knew that Iran would not give up their nuclear weapons.

We are the verge of expanded war in Europe and Middle East, but the key issue is Trump foreign policies are able to pull us back from the brink but don’t forget one thing, this was Obama and Biden doing!